Ability and willingness as sufficiency conditions for family-oriented particularistic behavior:implications for theory and empirical studies by De Massis, Alfredo et al.
1 
 
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family-
Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory 
and Empirical Studies 
 
Alfredo De Massis 
Reader in Family Business & Director of the Centre for Family Business 
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development 
Lancaster University Management School 




Senior Research Associate 
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development 
Lancaster University Management School 
Bailrigg, Lancaster (UK), LA1 4YX 
j.kotlar@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
Jess H. Chua 
Professor in Family Business 
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development 
Lancaster University Management School 
Bailrigg, Lancaster (UK), LA1 4YX 
j.chua2@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
James J. Chrisman 
Professor of Management 
Department of Management and Information Systems 
Mississippi State University 
Mississippi State, MS 39762-9581 USA 
Tel. +1 662-325-1991, jchrisman@cobilan.msstate.edu 
and 
Centre of Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise 
University of Alberta 
 
 
Accepted for Publication in the Journal of Small Business Management 
Acknowledgements 
Earlier versions of this manuscript were presented at several conferences. We wish to thank the 
participants at those conferences and especially Pramodita Sharma and Thomas Zellweger for 
valuable comments and suggestions.  
Keywords: Family Business, Particularistic Behavior, Ability, Willingness, Research Issues 
2 
 
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family-
Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory 
and Empirical Studies 
 
_______________ 
Distinguishing sufficient conditions from necessary conditions is crucial in both theoretical and 
empirical studies. We propose that the sufficiency condition for family involvement to produce 
family-oriented particularistic behavior in a firm requires the presence of both ability and 
willingness. We demonstrate how the omission of this sufficiency condition in commonly-used 
theoretical models employed to explain how family involvement affects firm behavior can result 
in theoretical limitations and empirical indeterminacy. Finally, we discuss how considering both 
ability and willingness can lead to better theory, more generalizable empirical findings, and help 
explain heterogeneity among firms with family involvement.  
_______________ 
 
The presence of a controlling family and the active involvement of family members in the 
ownership, governance, and management of business organizations are common features of the 
global economy (Anderson and Reeb 2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Shanker and Astrachan 1996; 
Villalonga and Amit 2009; Westhead and Cowling 1998). The need for a separate theory of the 
family firm, however, depends on whether these features influence business organizations to 
develop distinctive resources, display particularistic behaviors, or produce dissimilar types and 
levels of performance compared to firms without these features. Consequently, researchers in 
management, economics, and finance have devoted and continue to devote great efforts to 
determining whether and how family firms may differ from non-family firms in resources, 
behavior, and performance (Gedajlovic and Carney, 2010; Gedajlovic et al. 2012).  
Our focus here is on the behavior among firms with family involvement that, if it exists, 
is idiosyncratic when compared with that of firms without family involvement and, thus, 
differentiates the two types of organizations. This behavior has been called family-oriented 
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particularistic behavior by researchers (e.g., Carney 2005). Such behavior is supposed to arise 
from the values, desires, and motives of the involved family including, for example, viewing the 
firm as “our business” (Demsetz and Lehn 1985), the desire to perpetuate the family dynasty 
(Casson 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003b), and the need to behave altruistically toward 
other family members (Schulze et al. 2001). 
So far, researchers have presented conflicting propositions and evidence with respect to 
how family involvement influences firm behavior. For example, in terms of risk taking, a 
number of scholars have proposed and provided evidence showing that family firms are more 
risk-averse. Reasons proposed include undiversified wealth needed to maintain controlling 
ownership (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Morck and Yeung 2003; Naldi et al. 2007; Schulze, 
Lubatkin, and Dino 2002), fear of losing control (McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko 2001; 
Mishra and McConaughy 1999) and the preservation of socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia, 
Makri, and Larraza-Kintana 2010). On the other hand, evidence has also been presented to 
support the view that family involvement in ownership and management tends to promote 
entrepreneurial risk taking (Zahra 2005; Zahra, Hayton, and Salvato 2004). Indeed, controlling 
families have sometimes been found to be willing to increase the risk faced by the firm if control 
and socioemotional wealth are at stake (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007).  
Some researchers suggest that the inconsistencies in the empirical evidence are due to 
measurement issues (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; Rutherford, Kuratko, and Holt 2008) 
because, for example, empirical studies do not use the same definition to differentiate family 
from non-family firms. Others suggest that the inconsistencies are due to missing moderators or 
mediators (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2012). While we do not deny that omission of moderators or 
mediators and differences in measurements can lead to alternative theoretical predictions and 
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conflicting empirical results, we believe that empirical research must be guided by theory and 
how that theory is conceived is at least as important. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to 
help improve our understanding of the differences between the behaviors of firms with and 
without family involvement by presenting a conceptual model of the determinants of the family-
oriented particularistic behavior of family firms.  
Our model builds on the seminal work by Litz (1995) and the more recent empirical 
study by Chrisman et al. (2012), and is founded on the general idea that while family 
involvement in ownership, management and governance are defining features of family firms, 
they will not lead to family-oriented particularistic behavior unless the involvement gives the 
involved family the ability in terms of discretion to act idiosyncratically, and unless the involved 
family has the willingness in terms of intention or commitment to pursue family-oriented 
particularistic ends.1 In other words, ability and willingness are necessary but individually 
insufficient conditions; sufficiency requires both, not just one or the other. This sufficiency 
condition is intuitively obvious but we believe is generally ignored in family business research, 
perhaps because the serious theoretical limitations and empirical indeterminacy problems that 
result when the condition is ignored are not fully understood. Although the constructs are not 
new to the family business literature and have been used explicitly and implicitly in prior work, 
the theoretical and empirical problems exist, because the constructs have not always been used in 
combination as theoretically required to satisfy the sufficiency condition.   
Thus, the purpose here is to explain and illustrate how ignoring the sufficiency condition 
can make unreliable and create inconsistencies in both theoretical and empirical findings about 
family firm behavior. We then suggest how the theoretical limitations and empirical 
indeterminacy may be resolved in future studies. 
                                                          
1 There is also a resource-based component of ability which we do not address in this paper. 
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The most important contribution of this paper to the family business literature is to point 
out a crucial sufficiency condition that has often been missing in models commonly used to 
differentiate the behaviors of firms with and without family involvement. Distinguishing 
between sufficient and necessary conditions is always important and the actions of any firm, with 
or without family involvement, are influenced by the ability and willingness of its owners, 
managers, and board members to pursue specific goals, policies, and strategies. However, ability 
and willingness in firms with family involvement are especially important because these firms 
usually have extraordinary discretion to act and unique influences that affect their actions. But 
considering only ability or only willingness runs the risk of attributing behavior or performance 
that might be found in any owner-managed firm to family involvement (Dyer 2006). Put 
differently, because family involvement may provide a firm with unique abilities to act 
idiosyncratically and a broader range of goals (Chrisman and Patel 2012), drawing attention to 
the sufficiency condition has special importance.  
By pointing out the theoretical problems and empirical indeterminacies associated with 
other commonly used models of family firm behavior, this paper will help researchers 
understand the theoretical and empirical adjustments that must be made to make the results of 
their investigations more reliable and credible. By also explaining how the model can be applied 
to overcome the key theoretical and empirical problems identified, this can help make theory 
development and empirical testing proceed in a more rigorous fashion. Finally, we also discuss 
how the model may be used to help explain why family firms are heterogeneous, a viewpoint 
that has recently received more attention from family business researchers (e.g., García-Álvarez 
and López-Sintas 2001; Melin and Nordqvist 2007; Sharma and Nordqvist 2008; Westhead and 
Howorth 2007).  
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A Model of Family-Oriented Particularistic Behavior 
As mentioned previously, research investigating relationships between family 
involvement and firm behavior has produced persistent inconsistencies and led to a growing 
agreement among researchers that the relationship between family involvement and the 
particularistic behaviors of family firms is likely to be influenced by an array of mediating and 
moderating factors (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2012; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; Sacristán-Navarro, 
Gómez-Ansón, and Cabeza-García 2011). Based on these ideas, we present a model of family 
firms’ particularistic behavior wherein two separate but interrelated family involvement 
engendered theoretical constructs – ability and willingness – determine the relationship between 
family involvement and family-oriented particularistic behaviors. Specifically, the model 
proposes that the involved family’s ability and willingness are determinants of whether the firm 
with family involvement will exhibit family-oriented particularistic behaviors. They act 
separately as necessary conditions but neither, by itself, constitutes a sufficient condition. In 
other words, family firms will not behave in a particularistic fashion unless the involved family 
has both the ability and the willingness to make that happen. A detailed presentation of the 
model follows below. 
We define ability as the discretion of the family to direct, allocate, add to or dispose of a 
firm’s resources. It includes latitude in selecting the goals of the organization and in choosing 
among the range of feasible strategic, structural, and tactical decisions (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein 1987; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). The organizational authority arises from 
the family’s power and legitimacy as defined by the prevailing cultural, political, regulatory, 
competitive, and capital market conditions (Carney 2005; Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma 1999). 
This ability as discretion arises from family involvement in ownership, governance, or 
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management and is positively related to the involvement; but the relationship may be moderated 
by other factors. For example, the family’s strategic control of a firm’s assets relative to its 
ownership may be enhanced through the establishment of pyramids, cross-holdings, and dual 
voting class shares (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000); the family may be able to bypass the 
board when making strategic decisions (Carney 2005; Lorsch and MacIver 1989); and the family 
may be able to constrain managerial actions without being directly involved in the top 
management team by reducing the resources available to them (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; 
Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987). On the other hand, powerful non-family stakeholders such as 
board members, customers, suppliers, and government may constrain the ability of family 
owners and managers to exercise their discretion to act. 
We define willingness as the favorable disposition of the involved family to engage in 
distinctive behavior. It encompasses the goals, intentions, and motivations that drive the family 
with family involvement to influence the firm’s behavior in directions that are different from 
those pursued by firms without family involvement. For example, firms with family involvement 
may pursue family-oriented goals such as family harmony, family social status, and family 
identity linkage (Chrisman et al. 2012; Kotlar and de Massis, 2013) that create or preserve 
socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007). Willingness is related to but does not 
necessarily accompany family involvement (e.g., Litz, 1995). For example, even with the same 
extent of family involvement, personal attachment to the firm, self-identification with the firm, 
intention for intra-family succession, and desire to preserve socioemotional wealth can vary 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2002, 2003a). Therefore, different from ability as discretion, 




Our model is presented in Figure 1A. As the figure shows, family involvement in 
ownership, governance, and management alone will not indicate whether a family firm will 
exhibit family-oriented particularistic behavior. The relationship between the behavior and 
family involvement is determined by the family’s ability and willingness. Ability as discretion is 
directly related to family involvement as shown by the solid line connecting family involvement 
to ability because discretion accompanies ownership, governance, and management. On the other 
hand, willingness to engage in particularistic behavior does not necessarily arise as a result of 
family involvement, as shown by the dashed line. Yet ability and willingness are necessary 
conditions for the firm to behave in a particularistic manner. In addition, the “AND” box shows 
that sufficiency requires both to be present. In other words, neither, by itself, is sufficient to 
produce the behavior that distinguishes firms with and without family involvement.2 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
We illustrate this conceptually with intra-family succession, which many researchers use 
to differentiate family firms from non-family ones. Intra-family succession will not occur unless 
the family is willing to pass control of the firm to the next generation (Chua et al. 1999; De 
Massis, Chua, and Chrisman 2008). Thus, even with the requisite discretion, intra-family 
succession will not come to pass unless it is consistent with the family’s wishes. Conversely, a 
family cannot unilaterally make intra-family succession happen no matter how willing it is if the 
family does not have the discretion. 
                                                          
2 Psychological perspectives of organizational behavior inform us that an individual’s intention towards a specific 
behavior can be affected by the perceived control over that behavior (Ajzen 1991) or that self-efficacy affects 
motivation (Gioia and Poole 1984; Gist 1987). This means that ability may affect willingness. The effect would 




To summarize, it is intuitively obvious that no particular organizational behavior will be 
exhibited in a firm with family involvement unless the involved family is both able and willing 
to actively engage in it or passively allow it. Thus, ability without willingness, or vice-versa, is 
logically and practically insufficient to produce a particular behavior. Therefore, we propose 
that: 
P1. Ability as discretion is a necessary condition for family involvement to produce 
the family-oriented particularistic behavior that distinguishes family firms from 
non-family firms. 
 
P2. Willingness is a necessary condition for family involvement to produce the 
family-oriented particularistic behavior that distinguishes family firms from non-
family firms. 
 
P3. Neither ability nor willingness, individually, is sufficient for family involvement 
to produce the family-oriented particularistic behavior that distinguishes family 
firms from non-family firms. 
 
P4. Ability and willingness together is sufficient for family involvement to produce 
the family-oriented particularistic behavior that distinguishes family firms from 
non-family firms. 
 
Consequently, the sufficiency condition requiring both ability and willingness is critical 
at the most basic level of theory. Surprisingly, this has often been ignored in the theoretical 
lenses commonly used by family business researchers. 
Comparison with Commonly Used Models 
Figure 1B shows how some models most commonly used to explain family business 
behavior are different from ours because they assume that the combination of ability and 
willingness is not required to predict the particularistic behavior of family firms. Thus, without 
the “AND” box, the model presented in Figure 1B suggests that ability and willingness are, 
individually or each by itself, sufficient for family involvement to produce the particularistic 
behavior that distinguishes family firms from non-family firms. In addition, those who rely on 
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willingness alone to predict family firm behavior also assume that willingness necessarily 
follows family involvement as shown by the solid line connecting family involvement to 
willingness. We illustrate this by discussing below the implicit and explicit assumptions involved 
when agency theory, stewardship theory, behavioral theory, and stakeholder theory are applied to 
explain family business behavior.3 
Agency Theory. The agency theory of the firm concerns itself with conflicts of interests 
and asymmetric information in the relationships between owners and managers, between owners 
and the firm’s lenders, and between majority and minority owners. In the conflict between 
owners and managers, the manager’s ability to act without regard to the wishes of owners arises 
from asymmetric information, which makes it difficult for owners to know fully what the 
managers are doing (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Likewise, the discretion of owners allows them 
to determine whether to offer incentives or engage in monitoring to control managerial behavior. 
In some situations, family owners may even take their discretion to the extreme by excluding 
non-family members from the management team to minimize agency problems (Ilias 2006).  
In the case of owners versus lenders, the property rights of ownership in combination 
with asymmetric information give owners the ability to manage resources in pursuance of their 
interests at the expense of the lenders’ interests (Smith and Warner 1979). Finally, in the case of 
majority versus minority owners, the majority owners have the discretion, again by virtue of the 
property rights endowed by ownership, to allocate and shift resources in such a way that their 
                                                          
3 We do not discuss the resource-based view of the family firm which is based on ability in terms of resources 
generated as a result of family involvement. The approach, as applied, typically suffers from a similar logical 
insufficiency by implicitly assuming that family and non-family firms will pursue the same goals or have the same 
aspirations. The theoretical issue that we do not address here is whether ability and willingness are requisite to the 




interests are enhanced at the expense of the minority owners through arrangements increasing 
their control rights above their cash flow rights (Villalonga and Amit 2006). 
Family and non-family firms are supposed to have dissimilar levels of ability as a result 
of different levels of ownership concentration and different degrees of information asymmetry 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; Greenwood 2003). Therefore, agency theory would predict behavioral 
and performance differences between the two types of organizations. This characterization of 
family business behavior is based entirely on ability. It assumes decision makers only have 
economic goals and are always willing to pursue their economic self-interest at the expense of 
others. Without this willingness, the family firm will not necessarily produce the behavior 
hypothesized by agency theorists to differentiate family firms from non-family ones. For 
example, non-economic goals (Chrisman et al. 2012) and issues of self-control in dealing with 
family members (Schulze et al. 2001) can lead to behavioral variations that deviate substantially 
from agency theory predictions. 
Stewardship Theory. The stewardship theory explanation of family firm behavior (Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Donaldson 1990; Donaldson and Davis 1991) is based on 
willingness and implicitly assumes that ability is invariant. It proposes that family managers look 
at their firm as a vehicle to accomplish their needs for security, social contribution, belonging, 
and standing within the family (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Lansberg 
1999; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Scholnick 2008). As a result, the goals of family owners and 
managers are assumed to be aligned with those of their businesses (Corbetta and Salvato 2004). 
This means that, even when they have the ability to pursue their self-interests at the expense of 
other stakeholders, they are unwilling to do so. In effect, stakeholder theory predicts that certain 
particularistic behavior of the opportunistic variety will never happen in the family firm.  
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With respect to the sufficiency of ability and willingness, stewards and agents alike are 
subject to limitations in information processing capacities, imperfect and asymmetric 
information, and bounded reliability (Verbeke and Greidanus 2009). These limitations to ability 
can potentially create problems between the ability of owners and managers to comprehend and 
achieve their goals even though no opportunistic behavior is involved. Thus, ignoring ability or 
incorrectly assuming it to be invariant can lead to the same problems as implicitly assuming 
willingness is invariant. This is because the steward’s ability may be as variable among family 
firms as willingness. 
Behavioral Theory. Behavioral theory (Cyert and March 1963) has been used as the basis 
for proposing that family firms are more willing to pursue the emotional value of ownership 
(Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 2008; Zellweger and Astrachan 2008); emphasize the creation and 
conservation of socioemotional wealth for the family (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007); and act 
altruistically toward family members (Lubatkin et al. 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003b). 
Ability as discretion is implicitly assumed in the form of the involved family’s control. By 
ignoring the variability of ability, behavioral theory suffers from the same potential limitations as 
stewardship theory. The theory, however, incorporates the ideas that goals and aspirations may 
vary, are subject to negotiation, and may be considered sequentially (Cyert and March 1963), 
which makes it a potentially more robust predictor of family firm behavior.  
Stakeholder Theory. Given that the family plays a central role in controlling the strategic 
direction of the firm (Chua et al. 1999), scholars have proposed that stakeholder theory may be a 
helpful framework for studying family business behavior (Litz 1997; Sharma 2004; Zellweger 
and Nason 2008). The theory (Freeman 1984; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997) proposes that a 
stakeholder group’s salience, in the sense that it is able to influence goal selection in a firm with 
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family involvement (Chrisman et al. 2012) or to define the internal and external constraints on 
the firm’s behavior (Zellweger and Nason 2008), is determined by the group’s power, 
legitimacy, and urgency. In the family business context, the interests of an internal stakeholder 
group, be it family members, non-family managers, or non-family shareholders, would have 
salience only if the particular group has the power and legitimacy to make those interests salient 
to the controlling family. Holding power and legitimacy constant, the willingness of stakeholders 
to press their demands on the controlling family to engage in certain behavior is thought to be 
determined primarily by the urgency (importance and immediacy) of stakeholder demands. Thus, 
this theoretical approach contains elements of both willingness and ability. However, as applied 
to family firms, researchers have typically ignored the willingness or urgency component of the 
theory (Chrisman et al. 2012; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). 
In summary, the critical addition that our model makes to theoretical frameworks 
commonly applied to family firms is the sufficiency condition requiring that ability and 
willingness must both be present for family-oriented particularistic behavior to be observed 
among firms with family involvement. Differentiating between necessary and sufficient 
conditions is always crucial in theory building, not just for family business research. In the case 
of family business research, it has critical implications for theoretical validity and empirical 
determinacy. This is the subject of the next section.  
Theoretical Limitations and Empirical Indeterminacy 
In this section, we first discuss how the failure to satisfy the sufficiency condition limits 
the applicability of theoretical conclusions about family firm behavior. Then we focus on the 
issues related to determinacy of empirical results.  
Theoretical Limitations  
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When a theory does not explicitly specify a necessary assumption, it omits an important 
condition needed to determine a firm’s behavior. This leads to two problems with the 
conclusions derived. First, as a result of omitting a condition needed to reach logical sufficiency, 
the causes of behavior cannot be unequivocally determined and the theory’s predictions are 
unreliable or even invalid. Second, the theoretical development implies implicitly that the 
missing condition will not affect the theoretical predictions because it is either irrelevant or 
invariant (Musgrave 1981). Therefore, at best, the theory’s predictions are applicable to only 
those situations where the missing condition does not affect the theoretical outcome. We 
illustrate this below by providing some examples of models of family-oriented particularistic 
behavior where either ability or willingness has not been explicitly taken into account and then 
demonstrating how varying the implicit (or missing) condition leads to different theoretical 
predictions. 
In considering the time horizon of family firms, the literature based on agency theory 
suggests that family firms will suffer from costs associated with excessive power in the hands of 
the family (Morck and Yeung 2003) and that this causes family members to embrace a shorter 
investment horizon. The power of the family as portrayed in the article is consistent with our 
idea of ability as discretion; therefore, we interpret this as an ability-based proposition. But, by 
allowing willingness to vary, the dominant idea in agency theory that the decision maker is 
solely concerned with economic goals may be challenged by the accumulating evidence that 
some family firms pursue non-economic goals (Chrisman et al. 2012; Zellweger et al. in press), 
which often requires long time horizons (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; James 1999). The resulting 
behavioral prediction is thus ambivalent: if we assume that family members always follow only 
economic calculative rationality (i.e., willingness is invariant), the theory will lead to the 
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prediction of a shorter time horizon in family firms’ investments. Alternately, when we assume 
that the involved family pursues non-economic goals (i.e., willingness varies), a longer time 
horizon is more likely. As the work of Chrisman and Patel (2012) on R&D investments show, 
both outcomes are possible depending on the willingness of family owners to use their ability to 
focus on short-term or long-term considerations. Thus, the theoretical models that rely only on 
ability and do not account for willingness will suffer from the theoretical limitations discussed. 
The same line of reasoning can be directly applied to a number of other particularistic 
behaviors in which family firms have been said to differ from non-family firms. The most 
studied behavior differentiating family with and without family involvement is intra-family 
succession (Debicki et al. 2009). In considering this, a family’s ability to exercise discretion is 
represented by the family’s power and legitimacy to dominate the firm’s decision about the 
appointment of a successor (Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua 2003). However, ability only 
constitutes a necessary condition for succession to actually occur; the involved family must be 
willing to appoint a family member (who must also be willing) over a non-family member for it 
to happen. As shown by De Massis, Chua, and Chrisman (2008), families may nevertheless 
decide not to pursue intra-family succession even when the discretion exists.   
Our third example comes from studies about the social (Déniz and Suárez 2005; Dyer and 
Whetten 2006) and environmental behaviors of family firms (Berrone et al. 2010). In the 
presence of willingness, the ability assumption is obviously necessary because a family firm 
needs sufficient discretion in decision making to be able to deflect organizational efforts from 
pure profit-maximization towards the pursuance of external stakeholders’ interests. On the other 
hand, willingness is crucial because incentives to pursue non-financial goals that benefit non-
family members could depend on variables such as the extent to which the family identifies with 
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the business, is committed to the transgenerational sustainability of the business, and is 
concerned with the joint reputation of the firm and family (Zellweger et al. in press). Again, the 
unique, particularistic behavior of family firms requires both ability and willingness, and models 
that consider only one of them will suffer from the theoretical limitations previously mentioned.  
The examples above demonstrate that when a theory of family firm behavior does not 
explicitly specify an ability or willingness assumption, it is unable to unequivocally determine 
firm behavior. In other words, the theory will, at best, be limited in its generalizability and, at 
worst, invalid. Since key antecedents, which could result in different or even the opposite 
behavior, are missing, ignoring willingness or ability can easily lead to conflicting theoretical 
predictions. 
Empirical Indeterminacy 
As the discussion above suggests, failure to differentiate between necessary and 
sufficiency conditions limits the applicability of theoretical predictions. Since interpretation of 
empirical evidence must be guided by theory, empirical results interpreted without differentiating 
necessary and sufficiency conditions will be misguided. For example, family business 
researchers and consultants often cite Ward’s (1987) observation that only 30% of family firms 
are handed over to the second generation.4 By labeling such transition as “successful” or 
“survival as a family business”, the number is interpreted as an indicator of ability and the 
implicit assumption is that intra-family succession can happen with ability alone or that family 
firms are invariant in their pursuance of intra-family succession.5 But, for example, if only 50% 
of family controlled firms intended to pursue intra-family succession, then the fact that 30% of 
                                                          
4 Others cited as sources for this number are Benson (1984) and Birley (1986). 




family firms achieve it suggests a “success” rate of 60%.6 In other words, by ignoring 
willingness, the 30% number suggests that less than one-third of family firms achieve their goal 
of intra-family succession but, after taking willingness into account, the same number suggests 
that nearly two-thirds achieve their goal. 
Aside from the problem illustrated above, there is a serious but less obvious interpretation 
problem in family business empirical research. This is a problem of empirical indeterminacy by 
which we mean the connection between the empirical results and the hypotheses tested may be 
severed. As discussed previously, scholars continue to hypothesize conflicting behaviors when 
relating family involvement to family-oriented particularistic behavior. Therefore, we use this 
specific situation to illustrate what we mean by empirical indeterminacy.  
For example, take the case of tax avoidance activities. It is proposed that family firms 
will exhibit higher tax avoidance behavior if the involved family has sufficient discretion to 
disregard minority shareholders’ concern because tax avoidance activities can be used to mask 
family centered rent-seeking (Chen et al. 2010).7 Thus, ability predicts a positive relationship 
between family involvement and tax avoidance. However, it can be argued on the basis of 
willingness that family firms will exhibit lower tax avoidance because the involved family wants 
to nurture the identity fit between the family and the firm or wants to protect the reputation of the 
family and the firm (Casson 1999; Zellweger et al. in press). This means that willingness predicts 
a negative relationship between family involvement and tax avoidance.  
                                                          
6 The 2003 American Family Business Survey (Massmutual and Raynold Institute 2003) suggests that 55% of the 
incumbents “wants the business to stay in the family” and 42% of the next generation “have the same level of 
commitment”. 
7 A similar study by Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) suggests that as managerial ownership rises, firms will 
exhibit less conservative financial reporting owing to a reduction in agency costs. Note that the empirical results 




The indeterminacy problem that results from not explicitly considering both ability and 
willingness is depicted in Figures 2A, 2B, and 2C. The figures assume that control variables have 
accounted for all influences on tax avoidance other than family involvement and thus permit us 
to represent the hypothesized relationships using two lines. Figure 2A shows the two hypotheses: 
tax avoidance rising with family involvement based on ability and tax avoidance falling with 
family involvement based on willingness. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 2A, 2B, 2C about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
If ability and willingness vary among firms with family involvement and both theoretical 
predictions are correct, then some of these firms’ level of tax avoidance activities will be 
determined by ability and others’ by willingness. In other words, some firms with family 
involvement will be willing to engage in more tax avoidance activities but do not have the ability 
to do as much as they want. These firms will plot on the ability line below the willingness line. 
On the other hand, some whose tax avoidance activities are determined by willingness would 
engage in a lower level of activities than what they are able to do; so they will plot on the 
willingness line below the ability line. Thus, if the empirical test conducted does not take both 
ability and willingness explicitly into account and combines all the firms, willingness determined 
and ability determined alike, and if the willingness determined and ability determined sample 
firms are more or less uniformly distributed along the hypothesized lines, a horizontal line would 
be obtained as Figure 2B shows. This means that, although both hypotheses are true, the tests 
would lead to the Type I Error of concluding that there is no relationship between family 
involvement and a firm’s tax avoidance. On the other hand, if a curvilinear line is fitted through 
the points, a Type II Error would occur showing a nonlinear relationship when the relationships 
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are all linear. This means that empirical results obtained without explicitly taking both ability 
and willingness into account are unreliable or invalid.  
Furthermore, depending on how the sample firms are distributed between ability 
determined and willingness determined ones, positive or negative lines are possible. In fact, if all 
of the sample firms are willing to engage in the level of tax avoidance they have the ability to do, 
they would all plot around a single point – the intersection of the ability and willingness lines.8 
The line fitted through these observations surrounding a single point has an indeterminate and 
completely unreliable slope. Thus, for the two reasons discussed above, inconsistencies in 
empirical results would not at all be surprising. 
Figure 2C shows that, even if the two hypotheses are both incorrect (i.e. willingness 
actually does not affect tax avoidance and ability actually negatively affects it), the best fitting 
straight line for the observed tax avoidance activities of a cross-section of family firms may, 
nevertheless, be positively inclined. This would then lead to the Type II Error conclusion that 
there is a positive relationship between family involvement and tax avoidance when there is none 
with willingness and a negative one with ability.  
The discussion above has concentrated on those situations where the hypotheses have 
been tested without explicitly considering the effects of both ability and willingness and when 
these effects lead to conflicting predictions about family-oriented particularistic behavior. But 
the indeterminacy problem exists even when the hypothesis being tested is explicitly based on 
only one – ability or willingness – and the empirical tests do not account for the missing one. 
This is because it will remain impossible to isolate the effect to be tested. For example, take the 
case when an ability based hypothesis predicts wrongly a positive relationship between family 
                                                          




involvement and family-oriented particularistic behavior. Without isolating the willingness 
effect, the test on an ability-based hypothesis may measure the willingness effect rather than the 
ability-based effect hypothesized. Thus, when the ability hypothesis is false but the willingness 
hypothesis is true, the empirical results would show a relationship. But the relationship found 
would be due to willingness and not the hypothesized one based on ability. 
Special Importance to Family Business Research 
Clearly, the owners, managers and board members of all firms require both ability as 
discretion and willingness to actively make or passively allow the firm to exhibit its behavior.9 
Therefore, the sufficiency condition applies to research for all firms. But for several reasons 
discussed below, the sufficiency condition, through its implications for theoretical limitations 
and empirical indeterminacy, is especially important at this developmental stage of family 
business research when the field is striving for legitimacy. This is because, as we discussed in the 
Introduction section, the need for a separate theory of the family firm must be justified on the 
basis that firms with family involvement develop distinctive resources, display particularistic 
behaviors, or produce dissimilar performances. This means that, in terms of behavior, main 
stream management research only needs to show that certain behavior exists but family business 
research needs to show two things: (i) that particularistic behavior exists among firms with 
family involvement in the sense that it does not exist or is less commonly observed in firms 
without family involvement; and (ii) that the behavior is due to family involvement. As we 
discussed above, these are not possible without satisfying the sufficiency condition in the sense 
that both ability and willingness are taken into account.    
                                                          
9 We have delayed this discussion until this point because we needed to explain the theoretical limitations and 
empirical indeterminacy problems first. 
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First, assuming willingness to be invariant, concentrated ownership endows the business 
owner with discretion to make choices. This is true whether or not the concentrated ownership is 
held by a family. It is what we meant when we stated previously that family involvement leads 
directly to ability as discretion and showed this relationship in Figure 1 as a solid line. This 
means that separating the influence of family involvement from that of concentrated ownership 
must be made (McConaughy et al. 1998; Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma 2005). But if the 
differences in behavior between the two types of firms arise purely from differences in ability as 
discretion due to ownership concentration, then there would be only the need for a theory of how 
ability endowed by concentrated ownership affects behavior and no need for one about family 
involvement. Thus, for a separate theory of family firm behavior to be needed, the differences in 
ability that have the potential to cause distinguishing behavior in firms with family involvement 
must arise from family involvement in its influence through means other than concentrated 
ownership (Dyer 2006). For example, if concentrated ownership in firms without family 
involvement tends to have more dispersed ownership outside the controlling block, then their 
discretion will be constrained by having to answer to the firm’s dispersed ownership and the 
outside board members’ fiduciary duties to all shareholders. Conversely, if concentrated 
ownership in the firm with family involvement tends to be accompanied by fewer non-family 
owners, then the involved family will have practically only legality as a constraint on its ability 
as discretion to choose from a wide set of goals (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). If true, then firms 
with the same level of concentrated ownership but with and without family involvement may, 
nevertheless, differ in terms of ability as discretion. Thus, ability would have to be taken into 
account when researchers search for particularistic behavior among firms with family 
involvement or the investigations would not predict or detect any difference in the behaviors of 
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the two types of firms. It would mean that a separate theory of family firm behavior would not be 
needed. 
Second, assuming ability the same, firms with family involvement are able to behave in a 
manner similar to that of firms without family involvement. If all firms with family involvement 
choose to behave exactly as the ones without, then there would not be particularistic behavior to 
separate the two types of firms. Therefore, in the situation where firms with and without family 
involvement have similar discretion due to having, for example, the same level of concentrated 
ownership, the involved family must choose to act idiosyncratically. This means that willingness 
must be considered or there would again be no need for a separate theory of family firm 
behavior. 
The third reason is empirical indeterminacy. As we pointed out above, as long as there is 
the possibility that family-oriented particularistic behavior is caused by both ability and 
willingness, empirical indeterminacy has the potential to reject family-oriented particularistic 
behavior even if it exists or accept such behavior even when it does not exist. Therefore, the 
credibility of a separate theory of the family firm demands the resolution of the indeterminacy 
problem which can be done only by explicitly taking the sufficiency condition into account.  
Potential Remedies 
As we discussed above, the sufficiency condition requiring that ability and willingness 
both be present must be satisfied for a firm with family involvement to exhibit family-oriented 
particularistic behavior or else theoretical predictions would be limited in their applicability or 
even invalid and empirical evidence would be logically indeterminate. Having illustrated the 
theoretical and empirical problems arising when family business studies fail to satisfy the 
sufficiency condition required, we turn next to discuss potential remedies. 
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Remedy for Theoretical Limitations 
The straightforward remedy for the theoretical problems is to ensure both ability and 
willingness are taken into account. This will require theoreticians to propose the circumstances 
under which one or the other dominates. Failing that, researchers can make explicit their implicit 
assumptions about either ability or willingness. This will not make a particular set of findings 
more generalizable but it will make explicit the limits to the generalizability of the conclusions 
so the findings can be reconciled with studies using different sets of assumptions. 
A further remedy is to use the ability and willingness framework to build an eclectic 
theory by reconciling different or divergent perspectives. For example, agency theory and 
stewardship theory have been used by researchers to develop contradictory predictions about the 
family firm’s decision to invest in firm renewal. The agency perspective suggests that family 
firms are less likely to invest in firm renewal than non-family firms because the involved 
family’s ability to consume perquisites, inflate compensation, and entrench themselves makes 
their interests less dependent in the short term on firm renewal (Bertrand and Schoar 2006; 
Morck and Yeung 2003, 2004; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003b). This ability to forestall the 
negative impacts of delayed firm renewal as well as the tendency toward risk aversion will make 
it less likely for a family firm to invest in firm renewal (Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2009). On 
the other hand, the stewardship perspective’s explicit assumption is that family members act as 
stewards and feel an augmented concern for the future of the business (i.e., willingness) leading 
to the prediction that family firms are likely to invest more in firm renewal. In sum, from the 
perspective of our framework, both the application of agency and stewardship suffer limitations 
in that they omit willingness- and ability-based considerations, respectively. In fact, the 
predictions of stewardship will not hold when the firm is constrained by the involved family’s 
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ability (e.g., by the extent to which family members have the discretion to extract private benefits 
from the firm or are bounded by an inability to effectively utilize information to achieve the 
desired combination of economic and non-economic goals), about which the stewardship theory 
is silent.  
Similarly, the predictions developed according to agency theory will not hold when the 
members of the involved family are not the self-interest-pursuing economic persons (e.g., 
managers are highly committed to the business, or the CEO desires an intra-family succession). 
Therefore, a more general theory of the family-oriented particularistic behavior concerning 
investment in firm renewal can be obtained by combining the two theories, using agency theory 
to predict the ability determined behavior and stewardship theory to predict the willingness 
determined one. Put differently, the application of our framework suggests that both theories can 
be improved by adding the contingency of willingness to agency theory and that of ability to 
stewardship theory.   
Remedy for Empirical Indeterminacy 
The empirical problems are much more difficult to solve because they can lead to 
indeterminacy by which we mean that there will exist a wide logical gap between the empirical 
tests conducted and the conclusions that may be made based on the empirical results. One way to 
solve the empirical indeterminacy problem is through data screening. By data screening, we 
mean that only family firms whose behaviors are determined purely by ability (willingness) and 
not by willingness (ability) are used to test purely ability (willingness) based hypothesis. Then, 
even if such behavior is generally affected by both, the sample firms’ behavior will be affected 
by only one. This is usually difficult but not impossible when secondary data are used.10 
                                                          




However, when primary data are to be collected, questions ascertaining that the behavior is 
determined by ability or willingness could be asked. For example, in studying debt financing, the 
respondents could be asked whether they have borrowed as much as they could when an ability 
hypothesis is to be tested; and they could be asked whether they have borrowed as much as they 
were willing, although they had the ability to borrow more, when a willingness hypothesis is to 
be tested.  
Second, the problem can be remedied by adding control variables for willingness (ability) 
when testing ability-based (willingness-based) hypotheses. For example, the number of outside 
directors in a family firm’s board of directors or the hiring of non-family managers is likely 
caused by both willingness to involve such people and ability to attract them to the firm. Testing 
ability-based (willingness-based) hypotheses will require the researcher to control for willingness 
(ability). The control variables can be collected by asking the respondents for their agreement 
with statements such as: “high profile outside directors cause problems” (willingness); “the 
external board members in the nomination committee demanded that high profile candidates be 
recruited as directors of our firm” (ability as discretion); “non-family professional managers, 
although more highly qualified, are not as committed” (willingness); “the family has the 
discretion to decide whether a family or non-family person should fill the managerial position” 
(ability as discretion).11 
Although conceptually different, the empirical indeterminacy problem is similar to the 
statistical problem caused by simultaneity of relationships. Therefore, a third solution is to 
estimate the ability determined and willingness determined behaviors simultaneously. In this 
case as in all the other, however, the prescribed solutions will require additional variables 
                                                          
11 These decisions may also be affected by whether the family firm has sufficient resources to attract outside 
directors and non-family managers. 
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measuring ability and willingness. To this end, we compiled a sample of ability and willingness 
related measures of family involvement (see Tables 1 and 2). As Table 1 shows, researchers have 
measured ability as discretion in terms of the family’s ownership control (Carney and Gedajlovic 
2002; Dyer and Whetten 2006; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; McConaughy et al. 2001; Mishra, 
Randøy, and Jenssen 2001; Randoy and Goel 2003; Westhead, Cowling, and Howorth 2001; 
Zahra, 2005); existence of agency control mechanisms (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz 2004; Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2001; Schulze et al. 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003b; Westhead et al. 
2001); participation of institutional investors (Fernández and Nieto 2005; George, Wiklund, and 
Zahra 2005; Gómez-Mejía, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri 2003); family member as CEO and/or 
chairman of the board (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003; McConaughy 2000; Voordeckers, Van Gils, 
and Van den Heuvel 2007; Westhead et al. 2001); presence of independent directors (Chen and 
Jaggi 2000); and the number and criticality of non-family managers (Chua, Chrisman, and 
Sharma 2003; Minichilli, Corbetta, and MacMillan 2010).  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 2 shows that willingness has been measured in terms of the family’s desires to 
retain or surrender control (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007; Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios 2001; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003b); whether the CEO has a family successor in mind (Sharma, 
Chrisman, and Chua 2003; Westhead et al. 2001); desire to go public (Sonfield and Lussier 
2004); the family’s commitment to the business (Chrisman et al. 2012); proportion of the family 
wealth invested in the business (Davis and Harveston 1998); time invested by future leaders in 
the family business (Shepherd and Zacharakis 2000); desire to preserve the socio-emotional 
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wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007); and altruism among family members (Eddleston and 
Kellermanns 2007). 
Ability and Willingness as Drivers of Family Firm Heterogeneity 
Recently, family business research has moved from a focus on family firms as 
homogeneous entities to be compared with non-family firms, to a recognition that they are 
heterogeneous and also need to be compared with each other (García-Álvarez and López-Sintas 
2001; Melin and Nordqvist 2007; Sharma and Nordqvist 2008; Westhead and Howorth 2007). 
Consequently, researchers have tried to identify different ‘types’ of family firms (Sharma and 
Nordqvist 2008; Westhead and Howorth 2007). For example, Arregle et al. (in press) suggest 
that family-influenced and family-controlled firms will behave differently. 
As stated repeatedly throughout the paper, we propose that family-oriented particularistic 
behaviors are determined by a combination of ability and willingness. This suggests that 
different levels of ability and willingness may be used to differentiate firms with and without 
family involvement, as well as to identify different types of firms with family involvement. 
Indeed, firms with family involvement may be theoretically or empirically divided into those for 
which the ability and willingness to behave idiosyncratically are low or high. This would divide 
the firms with family involvement into at least four different types that are likely to exhibit 
varying degrees of particularism in their behaviors.12  
When both ability and willingness are high the involved family’s position in the firm will 
be very powerful and the involved family will be motivated to direct the firm toward its 
                                                          
12 It is also possible to consider ability and willingness to engage in specific behaviors. We do not advocate that 
approach since it would lead to a special purpose rather than general classification (cf. Chrisman, Hofer, and 
Boulton 1988). Thus, the generalizability of studies that considered different behaviors would be based on the types 
of behaviors rather than the types of firms, reducing the utility of the results for further comparative studies and 




particularistic goals. In contrast, if both ability and willingness are low, the family’s position will 
be more delicate and the involved family is unlikely to push its family related agenda very 
strongly anyway because the family’s logic is counterbalanced by the interests of other 
individuals in the firm. When ability is high but willingness is low the involved family, despite 
its power, will only be tentative in pursuing family-based relatedness. On the other hand, if 
ability is low and willingness is high, the involved family will have “more desire than effect” on 
the business in terms of realizing family-oriented goals.  
What the above shows is that owing to differences in degrees of ability and willingness, 
family businesses can differ in subtle and interesting ways. It also shows that explicitly 
considering ability and willingness plus taking into account the varying degrees they exist in 
firms with family involvement may enable researchers to arrive at a better understanding of the 
heterogeneity of family firms. Recent empirical studies that included variables related to both 
ability and willingness have already enabled us to understand the subtleties involved. For 
example, heterogeneous R&D investments corresponding to similar degrees of family 
involvement can be better understood when considering variations in family goals (i.e., 
willingness) (Chrisman and Patel 2012); the prevalence of agency or stewardship in family firms 
can be more precisely predicted when accounting for the susceptibility of executives to family 
influence (i.e., ability) (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Lester 2011); and variations of the 
perceived acceptable selling price by family CEOs can be explained by their different intentions 
for transgenerational control (i.e., willingness) (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, and Chua 
2012). 
Summary and Conclusions 
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In this paper we argue that the models commonly used to study family business, 
especially when applied to differentiate the behaviors of firms with and without family 
involvement, need to be augmented by a sufficiency condition requiring the presence of both 
ability and willingness. The sufficiency condition is intuitively obvious but has not been given 
the attention it deserves. We discuss the nature and special importance of the sufficiency 
condition in family business research by using examples from the literature to illustrate the 
theoretical limitations and empirical indeterminacy that result when studies do not consider the 
condition explicitly. Finally, we discuss how the theoretical limitation and empirical 
indeterminacy problems can be avoided. 
The proposed framework based on the family’s ability and willingness contributes to 
further theory development in the field and provides guidance for testing theory in a more 
rigorous fashion. Considering both should allow family business researchers to assess more 
accurately the differences in the behavior and performance of firms with and without family 
involvement as well as the heterogeneity that exists among firms with family involvement. As 
explained above, firms with the same level of family involvement in ownership, governance, 
and/or management may have different sources and levels of willingness just as firms with the 
same intention and level of commitment may have different abilities. Thus, by incorporating 
ability and willingness into theory and research it may be possible to reconcile the conflicting 
propositions about family firm behavior and performance, thus helping to advance the 
development of a theory of the family firm.   
Studying both ability and willingness offers numerous opportunities for future research 
on family firms. For example, research is needed on how different sources and levels of ability 
and willingness influence the strategic behaviors and performance of family firms. In this 
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respect, it is generally understood that variations in ability among family firms will influence the 
opportunities pursued, the types of resources accumulated, and the manner in which strategies 
are implemented. However, how the willingness of family firms to pursue family-centered goals 
and unconventional strategies interacts with such ability has not been fully considered.  
It is also likely that systematic differences exist in factors that influence the ability and 
willingness of family firms to act in a particularistic manner. Given similar opportunities and 
resources, why some founders choose to maintain the concentration of power necessary for the 
family to pursue particularistic ends and some to disperse that power among various family 
members, and sometimes even non-family members, is not yet understood. In addition, we do 
not yet know what, besides self-control, or a lack thereof, constrains the willingness of family 
firms with controlling ownership to use their power to achieve family-centered goals. For 
example, what roles do industry practices, social and cultural norms, and the prior performance 
of the firm play in shaping the ability and willingness of family firms to act differently? 
Finally, research is needed on two important theoretical issues related to the sufficiency 
condition that we do not tackle in this paper. The first is ability in terms of resources – research 
on the relationship between ability as discretion and willingness on one side and ability as 
resources on the other. The second is how ability as discretion and willingness interact with 
resources and capabilities to influence the firm’s effectiveness and performance. Combined, 
studying these issues would make an important contribution to a better understanding of the 
resilience of family firms in economies around the world. 
In conclusion, decision makers in any context must consider what they want to do and 
what they are able to do. Family firms are interesting and important to study precisely because 
the discretion of family owner-managers to act based on their own propensities allows 
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researchers to better isolate the relationship between power, aspirations, and outcomes. But the 
potential value of studying family firms is lost if only half the puzzle is considered. 
Consequently, we hope our paper will inspire scholars to take ability and willingness of family 
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(C) Type II Error – Both hypotheses are false but ability 









Measures of Ability Used by Researchers 
 
Variables Effect Examples 
Ability determined by family ownership 
Control concentration + Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Dyer & 
Whetten, 2006; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007; McConaughy et al., 2001; 
Mishra et al., 2001; Randoy & Goel, 
2003; Westhead et al., 2001; Zahra, 
2005 
‘Relationalness’ of agency contracts + Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; Schulze et 
al., 2003b; Schulze et al., 2001; 
Westhead et al., 2001 
Presence of other institutional or private large-block share-
holders  
- Fernández & Nieto, 2005; George et 
al., 2005; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2003 
Control risk - Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2003 
Stage of family ownership - Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Schulze et 
al., 2003a; Sonfield & Lussier, 2004 
Ability determined by family governance 
The family CEO is also chairman + Voordeckers et al., 2007 
Agency cost control mechanisms - Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 
2001 
Number and ratio of independent directors to the board - Chen & Jaggi, 2000 
Ability determined by family management 
A family member is CEO + Gómez-Mejía et al., 2003; 
McConaughy, 2000; Westhead et al., 
2001 
CEO tenure + Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; Zahra, 
2005 
Board’s monitoring of top management - Mustakallio et al., 2002 
Management team size - Minichilli et al., 2010 
Number of non-family managers involved - Chua et al., 2003 
Criticality of family firm’s dependence on non-family 
managers  













Measures of Willingness Used by Researchers 
 
Variables Effect Examples 
Intention towards trans-generational succession 
Intention towards trans-generational succession (3-items scale) 
 
+ Chrisman et al., 2012; Zellweger et 
al., in press. 
Family’s and owner’s desire or preference to retain the control 
of the firm  
+ Romano et al., 2001 
CEO has a successor in mind + Sharma et al., 2003; Westhead et 
al., 2001 
Willingness to give up family control - Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Schulze 
et al., 2003b 
The family has considered "going public" - Sonfield & Lussier, 2004 
Family’s commitment to the business 
Family’s commitment to the business (7-items scale) + Chrisman et al., 2012 
Owner-manager's commitment to the organization (measured 
by financial stake) 
+ Davis & Harveston, 1998 
Investment of time and effort in the family business by the 
future leader 
+ Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2000 
Other variables 
Percentage of the owner's wealth invested in the business + Davis & Harveston, 1998 
Preservation of socioemotional wealth + Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007 
Altruism among family members (7 items scale) + Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
